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The purpose of this paper is to assess the nature and effectiveness of the European 
Union’s democracy promotion policy in Albania. Although the Balkan region was home to 
wars, ethnic tension, and political instability in the recent past, all western Balkan countries 
have expressed interest in gaining membership in the EU. The Albanian question is particu-
larly important because of the regression of democratic conditions in the country due to an 
18 month-long political gridlock that ended in violent and deadly protests in January 2011. 
This happened only two months after the EU voted unanimously for visa liberalization of 
Albanian citizens in the Schengen Area, and the EU has pressured the Albanian government 
to hold officials accountable for the deaths in 2011. This paper analyzes the “leverage and 
linkage” of the EU on Albanian domestic politics and whether the EU can offer sufficient 
incentives to facilitate democratic consolidation. 
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Introduction
The fall of communism throughout Eastern Europe from 1989-1992 has been re-
garded as a very significant moment for the triumph of democratic ideals. Considered by 
Samuel P. Huntington to be part of the Third Wave of Democratization, the echo of this 
critical change was heard from East Berlin to Leningrad. Citizens of brutal regimes decided 
that being fed Communist sensationalisms from the Politburo was not enough anymore, and 
they were ready to be part of a new free world. The mere toppling of an autocratic regime, 
however, was not enough for the establishment of strong foundations that would facilitate 
democratic consolidation. Inexperienced with freedom and almost completely unfamiliar 
with the notion of democracy, most Eastern European countries entered a transition period 
that has turned into their normalcy. 
This is the case of the southwestern Balkan country of Albania – it never fully con-
solidated as a democracy, existing in the political limbo status of a hybrid regime, and also 
experienced regression in democratic values in the late 1990s. The Balkan Peninsula has 
been home to the worst conflicts in recent European history. Ethnic tensions, culminating in 
the Bosnian War and Kosovo intervention, made the European Union reconsider its previous 
passive policy it had for its problematic kin. 
Democratization in the Balkans then, as stated by the EU and other multilateral or-
ganizations, became a necessity for stability in the region and overall European peace. The 
proximity of volatility to EU member states (Albania borders Greece and is less than 45 miles 
away from Italy) made the Balkan problem a priority in EU agenda. In 1997, The EU Gen-
eral Affairs Council introduced a regional approach for southeastern European countries, 
and included components for conditionality – at this time, contractual relations was the best 
‘carrot’ the EU could offer. Relations became stronger after the 1999 Stability Pact (SP), the 
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), the latter Stabilization and Association Agree-
ments (SAAs), for which the stakes have gotten higher since EU membership is the incen-
tive for democratic consolidation and satisfaction of the Copenhagen criteria1. Hopeful that 
the Balkans will not discredit the democratic peace theory, the EU has had an opportunity 
to help stabilize and democratize a historically problematic area through the power of their 
linkage, leverage, and conditionality. However, how successful has the EU been so far in using 
the Albanian ambition for the improvement of democracy in the country? Is the EU able to 
strengthen democracy in the region by continuing with their past strategies? In addition to 
analyzing EU democratization policy efficacy, this paper also seeks to explore whether there 
is potential for ameliorating these strategies.
Albania’s Democratic Record
Albania was a relative latecomer to the “democratic wave” that encompassed Eastern 
Europe in 1989-1991 (Huntington, 1991, pp.12-13). The absence of political ties with virtu-
ally any other country in the world had negative impacts not only for the Albanian economy, 
but it was also an obstacle for the creation a strong civil society. While Tito’s Yugoslavia was 
the exception for being more open than other communist countries, Enver Hoxha’s Albania 
was the exception for being more isolated. Although Albania’s Communist Party was de-
feated in elections in 1992, allowing the country to meet requirements to be an “electoral 
1 The Copenhagen criteria is the membership criteria that every aspiring EU member has to meet. The official EC 
website states that it includes: “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, human rights, minority issues; a free 
market economy; and the ability to adhere to political, economic, and monetary aims of the union”.
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democracy,” throughout the 1990s, Albania had a difficult time in fully consolidating demo-
cratic gains (Huntington, 1991, p.22). Its troubles in building well-functioning democratic 
institutions were caused by various factors, including: poor economic development (Alba-
nia ranked as the poorest of the communist states in Eastern Europe); legacies of a harsh 
communist regime that subjected citizens to propaganda and prevented emergence of civil 
society as seen in East-Central Europe and kept Albanians isolated from the wider world; 
pervasive corruption; and political polarization between former communists and various 
post-communist “democratic” parties. 
Table 1. Governance Scores of SAP Countries
Source: World Bank, 2010
In addition to structural and historical problems, the failure of leadership agency, has 
been one of the primary reasons for the slowed democratization process within Albania. Ac-
cording to the Corruption Index organized by Transparency International in 2011, Albania 
was ranked 95th in the world, a worsening from the 81st rank in 2002. Although an electoral 
democracy has been implemented since 1992, the Democratic Party has enjoyed extensive 
power over time and elections have often produced results in support of this party. 
The overall culture of political submission and low economic development had nega-
tive effects in the beginning for the adoption of democracy, but they were ironically helpful 
once protests started. After living in an un-free society for a long period of time, protesters 
saw no way back and demanded the implementation of a multi-party system, and thus elec-
toral democracy was at last adopted in 1992. Geographic location was also very important 
in helping dissenters in Albania follow through with democratization. Having its location 
in between Western and Eastern Europe was instrumental in helping with the influence of 
democracy progress and regress. Progress because the democratic movement around them, 
the spirit of the times - Zeitgeist, helped with the initial road to democratization, and regress 
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because of the fragmentation of opinion within domestic society because of seeing them-
selves as being located between antagonist countries. 
Economic problems in the early 1990s added to the country’s troubles. This culminated 
in the collapse of a pyramid scheme in 19972 that wiped out the savings and investments of 
thousands of citizens. Dissatisfaction with the political and economic system produced civil 
violence—which had both political-ideological and regional-clan elements—and led to the 
installation of international peacekeepers to stabilize the situation. By the end of the 1990s, 
when many other post-communist states had consolidated democracy and were moving 
ahead with EU membership negotiations, Albania was far behind both in terms of political 
and economic reform.
It was at this point that EU involvement became more pronounced in Albania, a phe-
nomenon that will be discussed more below. However, the main point to be made about the 
2000s is that the country did begin to see discernible democratic and economic progress. 
For example, its “democracy” score in the Polity dataset, which was a five in 1992, jumped 
to nine in year 2005 and has been a nine ever since. In addition, looking at the Voice and 
Accountability scores from the World Bank, there has been a steady increase in governance 
scores. In fact, Albania scores slightly more than Macedonia in this regard, which is an official 
candidate for membership, whereas Albania is still a potential candidate. 
EU Policies in Albania
The European Union’s policy was largely inactive during the first years of the existence 
of electoral democracy in Albania. As Milada Anna Vachudova (2005) states in Europe Un-
divided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration After Communism, the EU followed passive leverage 
after the fall of communism in Albania as opposed to actively pressuring domestic leaders to 
push for democratic consolidation. The first EU (European Community – EC at the time) 
program that Albania became eligible for was the Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Re-
structuring their Economies (PHARE) program that was created in 1989. This was created 
by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in order to come to 
aid to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. As Mayhew has pointed out, 
however, the problem with PHARE was that the aid was not based on conditionality. This 
explains why EU leverage had practically no effect on the trajectory of democracy in Alba-
nia. There was an opportunity to strengthen democracy there early on; the timing was right 
for Albanians who initially were zealous about political change, but it was not the right tim-
ing for the EU. It was only after the Dayton Accords of 1995 that the possibility of contrac-
tual relations with the Balkans was discussed. Conditionality, however, was introduced to the 
Western Balkans (WB) through the April 1997 regional approach, which required bilateral 
relations to the democratic conditions as explained in the Copenhagen criteria in return for 
financial assistance, cooperation agreements and unilateral trade preferences (Elbasani, 2008). 
Also, somewhat strong EU-Albania relations were not established until at least the year 2000, 
with the extension of duty-free access to EU market for products from Albania. 
The strategy that started accelerating the acceptance of the idea of WB as potential 
candidates was the Stability Pact of 1999 that was in reality a multilateral conflict preven-
tion policy initiated by the EU but backed by NATO, UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, IMF, 
etc. Balkan democratization was the consensus among them, because “the prospect of EU 
2 The Rise and Fall of Albania’s Pyramid Schemes http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/1999/wp9998.pdf
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membership is widely considered to be the cornerstone of any successful strategy to bring 
democracy and revitalization in the Balkan region” (Emerson & Gross, 1999). However, with 
SP the EU complicated conditionality for WB because it introduced both the regional com-
ponent and the individual country component. Nevertheless, what followed the Stability 
Pact, the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) was very important because it provided 
a clear framework tailored to the WB, including Albania, which first opened up the prospect 
of EU enlargement in the region. This was instrumental because the incentive became much 
stronger and EU leverage and conditionality turned into useful diplomatic tools once mem-
bership was mentioned as an option. After SAP, the EU had clear requirements that Balkan 
countries needed to meet before being considered as a candidate for membership. The SAP 
included incentives to develop bilateral political relationships in the region, increased direct 
assistance for democratization, and while SAP was the regional strategy, Stabilization and As-
sociation Agreement (SAA) was country specific (Elbasani, 2008).
Although SAP was introduced in 2000 and other Balkan countries had managed to 
negotiate SAAs as early as 2001, it was not until 2006 that Albania was able to negotiate SAA 
and become an official potential candidate for membership. Due to leverage power of the 
European Union, however, Albania has made steps toward progress from the beginning of 
the 2000s. Entering a SAA in 2006 and having enjoyed liberalized trade with EU member 
countries for more than a decade has produced high linkage with the West as opposed to 
looking at the post-communist countries of the East, which has helped with the continued 
successes of the transition. It has also enjoyed financial assistance through the Community 
Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) program, which in 
turn increased leverage of the EU in Albania. As British historian Timothy Garton Ash stated, 
“The EU’s leverage on aspiring member states appears to be the single best tool for promot-
ing stability and democracy. Enlargement through democratization has been part of EU for-
eign policy ever since the Copenhagen criteria for membership” (Vachudova, 2005, p.247).
The European Union has provided aid to Albania for the strengthening of political 
institutions, the creation of a strong justice system, and the support of education (European 
Commission 2012). Although failures of agency in the 1990s have produced undesirable 
economic results, the Bertelsmann Management Index ranks the country 38 out of 128. 
Political participation has greatly increased over the years and the emergence of a middle 
class after the change into a market economy has helped with the creation of a civil society 
that demands more from political leadership. In fact, one of the latest EU projects is the 
launch of ten contracts worth €1.2 million with civil society organizations to strengthen 
democracy and human rights (European Commission 2012). These were launched through 
the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). In addition, Albania 
received financial assistance from the EU through the CARDS program from 2001-2006, 
and through the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) from 2007 until now. Finally, perhaps 
the most positive changes that the country has experienced recently have been the 2009 ac-
cession into NATO and the December 2010 visa liberalization for the Schengen area.
The EU as a Democracy Promoter
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Figure 1. Albania IPA Financial Assistance
Source: European Commission, 2012
In Europe Undivided, Vachudova (2005) writes in favor of intermediary rewards for 
countries that are engaging in these reforms like access to the EU market, development aid, 
and visa-free travel to the EU countries. The EU has recognized the importance of offering 
these intermediary rewards in order to create the positive image in these societies and take 
their achievements seriously. The visa liberalization was a very good intermediary reward and 
showed the trust of the EU towards the future of Albanian democracy, but the highly do-
mestic polarized politics had the country in a political deadlock for over a year, which ended 
with dangerous protests and the death of four protesters in the streets of Tirana, the capital of 
Albania just one month after. Although the Albanian Republican Guard was responsible for 
the shooting of the protesters, no one was arrested for about a year. 
As Kubicek (2005) stated in The European Union and Democratization, reluctant democ-
ratizers like Albania test EU’s commitment to enlargement through democracy promotion. 
This instance did indeed test their commitment, and the EU was adamant in pressuring 
the Albanian government to arrest whomever was responsible from the Republican Guard. 
The country was also visited by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of 
Europe and the Committee for the Prevention of Torture regarding the violent protests of 
January 21st, 2011. The strength of EU leverage was evident here because, although a year 
later, the Albanian government gave in and they issued the arrest of a high-ranking Guard 
commander. 
Although the EU has a lot of leverage in Albanian domestic politics they are more 
concerned with stability than democracy. Due to the recent economic crises, attention has 
diverted from enlargement policy in the Balkans and there has been a rise in EU skepticism 
about their capacity as a strong regional organization. It has been suggested that they are 
presently suffering not only from the economic aftershocks but also from an “enlargement 
fatigue (Vachudova, p.44).” With the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2005, two rela-
tively weak economies compared to the Western Europeans, the EU’s approach to enlarge-
ment is a more sobering one. As previously stated, the EU values stability over democracy, 
and thus values regional cooperation more. With the recent acceptance of Serbia’s applica-
tion for candidate status mainly due to improved talks with Kosovo suggests that enlarge-
ment fatigue, like the economy, perhaps occurs in cycles. 
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2012/iss1/3
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The Impact of the EU – The View from the EU
The EU offers two main reports on the advancement of Albanian governance based 
on EU accession criteria: the yearly Albania progress report (2011), and the Commission 
Opinion on Albania’s application for membership of the European Union (2010) that was 
a response to Albania’s application for membership on April 28, 2009. Both of these reports 
assess the areas where Albania has progressed and which areas it needs to work on. Over-
all, they are constructive recommendations and the Albanian government has decided to 
embrace them as a legal framework in order to get out of political transition. In fact, the 
Commission Opinion, the EU recognizes the effort of including them in Albania’s National 
Strategy for Development and Integration. 
The yearly progress report assesses meeting of EU criteria in an indirect way, because 
they report on progress however small or far away from European expectations it might 
be. On the other hand, the Commission’s Opinion on Albania’s application for member-
ship is more important because it is a more direct assessment of Albanian democracy based 
on the Copenhagen criteria, and conditionality of SAP. In the Opinion (2010), it is stated 
“Albania has, overall, smoothly implemented obligations under the Stabilization and Asso-
ciation Agreement.” Even though there has been overall progress and Albanian democracy 
was heading in the right direction, according to the Opinion, the country is still weak to be 
given candidate status. The Copenhagen criteria are especially problematic for the following 
reasons: institutional effectiveness and stability are still lacking; there are improper parliamen-
tary procedures; parliament also has no effective oversight; and, legislative inspection is still 
weak. Although there has been progress in the rule of law, especially with the fight against 
organized crime, reforms are still not up to par with EU standards.
There is a mix of positive and negative changes cited in the Opinion, but most impor-
tant is that the Commission sees potential and recognizes efforts to change. Albania generally 
satisfies SAP, has low inflation and has had positive growth rates despite the global economic 
crisis, and has reduced market entry barriers for new firms. However, it is seriously deficient 
in intellectual property rights, financial control, free movement of capital, agricultural and 
rural development and so on. These deficiencies, for O’Brennan and Gassie (2009, p. 2), are 
an indication that Albania is a “janus-faced applicant state.” By this they mean that although 
Albanian leaders have embraced EU instructions and paid lip service to EU ideals, their 
implementation has left much to be desired, and that is mainly due to the political polariza-
tion between the Democratic Party (DP) and the Socialist Party (SP).
The progress report from the EU for Albania also mentions the problem of political po-
larization and the stalemate that escalated into violent protests in early 2011. Although there 
is recognition that progress has been made, it is very limited due to the political deadlock 
that not only politically paralyzed the cabinet, but also diverted attention away from the im-
portance of EU policy reforms. Lastly, according to the EU, Albanian accession should take 
place in about three years if this rate of progress is kept up. Higher linkage to EU institutions 
can be a facilitator of the process; Albania presently participates in three EU programmes that 
contribute to linkage, but twinning projects have helped with building more cooperation 
between Albania and EU member states, while getting help to develop its own institutions.
Part IV the Impact of the EU—The View from Albania
After the fall of the totalitarian regime in Albania, common people would chant in the 
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streets “we want Albania to be part of Europe.”3 The aspiration to be part of the European 
community was present early on and it was so strong that the aspiration became synonymous 
with successful democratic change. About twenty years later though, there is still popular 
support for EU accession according to data from the Albanian Institute of International 
Studies (AIIS), but the percentage of supporters is not as high as in the very beginnings of 
democracy. Their credibility is questioned due to the recent shocks that the EU has expe-
rienced from the faltering economies of Greece, Portugal, and Spain, but also because of 
the controversial presence of European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). 
Although Kosovo is a separate state, the linguistic and cultural ties of the Kosovar Albanians 
(98% of the population) have made the citizens of Albania skeptical about EU democracy 
promotion while witnessing EULEX conflict management in Kosovo. 
The Albanian government has shown commitment to the idea of being part of the EU, 
if not fully then at least nominally. Out of all SAP countries, Albania is one of two countries 
that has a Ministry of EU Integration solely dedicated to the road to accession. Kosovo is the 
other one, while Montenegro and Croatia have included EU integration to their Foreign 
Affairs Ministries. The Ministry of EU Integration was created in 2003 and its existence is a 
testament of Albania’s strong ambition to be part of the European family. It creates reports, 
publishes strategies, and even administers even EU-funded projects that are intended to 
strengthen Albanian democratic institutions. Overall, the EU is generally seen as a positive 
force whose eventual acceptance of Albanian candidacy will be the indicator of the aban-
donment of the transitional regime. 
Conclusion
The European Union has established itself as a strong democratizing power for Eastern 
European countries, especially after the successes of CEECs (Central and Eastern European 
Countries) and their EU membership. The power of conditionality can play a transformative 
role in hybrid regimes like Albania or the rest of the WBs and be a great contributor in a 
country’s democratic consolidation, but it has to be coupled with high linkage and lever-
age. In order for these strategies to work, however, there needs to be a strong incentive for 
change  - in this case, EU membership is the ultimate goal, but the credibility of the institu-
tion should not be challenged either. If it is, then the institution’s transformative power is not 
as strong as previously thought. Lastly, because democratization can be a long process, the 
institution should offer intermediary rewards in order to strengthen relationships between 
the beneficiary country and member states.
As attested by data from the World Bank, and from reports from the EU, Albania has 
overall made positive progress in its path to democratization. EU conditionality, linkage and 
leverage, aid through either helping with governance or with free market enterprises, have 
all contributed to the positive changes Albania has experienced in the 2000s. The EU could 
ameliorate its strategy for Albania and the rest of the WBs by changing SAP and their double 
conditionality of bilateral regional cooperation and domestic progress. This double condi-
tionality makes the process simultaneously more vague and complex.
3 E duam Shqipërinë si gjithë Europa – Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS) Publication, 2004
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Figure 2. VA Democracy Change of SAP Countries, 1996-2010
Source: World Bank, 2012
Overall, if there is still a will in the EU to encourage democratization of Albania and 
cooperation with regional actors, this will play an important role in stabilizing the region. 
The most important reason is the fact that Albania is bordered by only other Albanian 
communities that are officially part of countries like Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Kosovo. There have been recent cases of minority rights issues in these countries and if the 
populations are discriminated against there will be turmoil (i.e., Macedonia in 2001). If 
Albania itself is not a consolidated democracy then the government will not even have the 
capacity to address the issue of attempts to secede. However, if the EU is aggressive about 
democratization and eventual membership of the WBs then the border claims will almost be 
irrelevant since they will all be part of the same Union.
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